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Abstract 
 
 Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain 
the call loan market’s liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust 
companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence 
of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the 
financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic.  In the call loan, like 
the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of 
the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals.  The call loan 
market did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the 
New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference. 
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The large national banks in New York dominated the call loan market for much of 
the national banking era. The considerable size of the call loan market meant that the 
large New York City banks inevitably had a substantial proportion of their assets in call 
loans.  Hence, the banks had a great incentive to maintain the market’s liquidity and 
stability. But their influence began to wane in the 1890s as outside intermediaries 
increased their lending in the call loan market.  By 1907 trust companies along with 
interior and foreign banks had become serious rivals to the New York banks on the call 
loan market.   
While the influence of outside lenders was suspected by the New York bankers, 
there was no systematic evidence being collected on the volume of lending or the identity 
of the lenders on the call loan market.  This paper presents the only direct evidence on the 
size of the call loan market and the types of intermediaries making loans on call.  It 
reveals that by 1907 the influence of outside lenders was large and likely beyond the 
control of the New York bankers.  The loss of control over the call loan market is an 
important reason for why the large New York national banks finally gave their support to 
the establishment of a central bank in the United States. 
The New York Clearing House banks had the incentive to monitor the solvency 
and liquidity of its member banks to ensure that the liquidity of the call loan market was 
preserved.  As intermediaries outside the Clearing House gained direct access to the call 
loan market, the ability of the New York banks to monitor the call loan market began to 
break down.  The trust companies and interior banks that issued loans on call were 
essentially free riding on the insurance provided by the Clearing House member banks.  
These outside participants in the call loan market were not concerned with the long-term 
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viability of the market – that is, they acted as if their actions individually were 
unimportant.   
We view the efforts of the bankers to maintain the call loan market as an example 
of an implicit insurance contract, a twofold contract between the stockbrokers and the 
bankers, as well as one between the bankers themselves.  The insurance argument 
describes fairly well the interactions between the bankers during 19th century panics 
through the New York Clearing House, combined with intentional lack of action – 
namely, forbearance on calling in loans -- between bankers and brokers during panics. 
 The relatively greater exposure to the call market of the large New York banks 
made them the “monitors” for systemic withdrawals from the call market.  If interior 
banks liquidated their call loans to retrieve reserves to meet depositor withdrawals during 
a panic, the resulting contraction in call loan liquidity would either force New York 
banks to: a) take over the loans, or b) risk the possibility that the borrower would have to 
sell the collateral on the market during a panic to pay the loan.  A fire sale of call loans 
during a panic would threaten a downward spiral in stock prices, deepening the crisis.  
The extension of additional call loans by the Clearing House banks was likely motivated 
by their perceptions of market illiquidity and their full recognition of their extensive 
exposure to the call market.1 Brunnermeier (2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) present a useful theoretical framework for understanding the effects of liquidity 
drying up in the call loan market.  A fire sale would result in a loss of market liquidity, 
that is, it became difficult to sell call loan collateral at a reasonable price.  At the same 
time, funding liquidity would disappear as brokers found it increasingly difficult to 
borrow against collateral, at least at a reasonable call loan rate and haircut. 
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I.  The Call Loan Market 
The call loan market was the key source of funds for margin borrowing on the 
New York stock market.  Call loans were potentially demandable or callable on notice 
within the day.  They were typically not called after 12:15pm, but that was by custom 
rather than as a rule.  The implicit term of the loan was overnight, but 95 percent of loans 
were renewed or rolled over.  The call loan rate in New York City was a competitive 
market rate on new loans, and the renewal rate was the average of loan rates observed on 
that day.  The borrower could sell the collateral and seek to substitute another stock for 
the liquidated collateral in order to maintain the loan.  All such substitutions were subject 
to the approval of the lender, and all lending was to be transacted through a broker.2 
Call loans typically were made for 80 percent of the collateral presented, and the 
lender held the collateral, usually the stock certificates purchased with the loan, akin to 
the current method of purchasing stock on margin.  Call loans in New York City also had 
particular legal covenants that essentially gave all power to the lender in the event the 
borrower breached any of the contract terms.3  For example, the lender could, upon 
breach of contract, sell the collateral with the borrower still being liable for the remaining 
balance if the sale price was insufficient to cover the loan balance.  Borrowers could 
default on a loan if the collateral value fell below 80 percent of the loan value, but they 
would then run the risk of being shut out of the call loan market in the future.  Banks, 
however, were known to forebear on calling in loans whose collateral value was less than 
loan’s value, particularly during a financial crisis.  The hope was that the collateral value 
would return to normal after the crisis had past. Instances of formal litigation were 
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uncommon, likely because of perceived litigation costs and the resulting payment delays.   
Similar to the present-day margin lending, a transaction involving call loans could 
originate with money brokers (located anywhere in the country), banks, or on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Each alternative fund source would administer their loans 
differently.  Some might call them in regularly, or others like the New York banks might 
just roll them over unless otherwise directed.  Ultimately, the sources of call loan funds 
were banks and other intermediaries, and the money broker played the role of loan 
distributor for banks.4  In order to lend on the stock exchange, suppliers of funds had to 
lend through a broker who was a member of the exchange.   
In New York City, the national banks developed relationships with brokerage 
houses and other brokers, and they lent on call through these brokers on the exchange.  
Institutions that lent on the exchange were either New York City banks or trusts, or out of 
town institutions that lent funds through New York City correspondents.  In this latter 
case, the New York City intermediaries (national or state banks, or trust companies) acted 
as agents in arranging call money loans for the out of town banks, and often the out-of-
town banks were required to hold balances with their New York intermediary.  The 
durability of the lender-broker relationship was important between the New York City 
intermediaries – either as agents for interior banks or as the fund providers -- and the 
brokers that lent the call loans on the stock market.   
A unique feature of the Panic of 1907 reveals the concern of the large banks for 
the call loan market: the increase in loans at New York national banks during the panic.  
Sprague (1910, pp. 300-1) describes the volume of loans taken over by New York 
national banks to maintain liquidity in the money markets and the stock exchange: 
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We have already seen that call loans were particularly favored by both by 
trust companies and the outside banks.  Even in 1873 the clearing-house banks 
were able to reduce loans of that kind relatively little, and it might be naturally 
expected that still less contraction would have been feasible in 1907. …. 
Among the many lessons which may be drawn from a study of the 
experiences of the national banks during crises, the entire absence of liquidness in 
call loans, so far as New York banks are concerned, is the most certain and by no 
means the least important. Out of a total loan increase of $63,000,000, call loans 
accounted for $54,000,000; and, furthermore, time loans with collateral security, 
which are largely of stock-exchange origin, account for another $4,000,000.  
 
 
The New York banks took over call loans because, as Sprague (1910, p. 302) 
notes, ‘Call loans . . . are local New York loans, and consequently the amount of them 
which must be made by New York banks increases when other lenders retire from the 
market.’           
Financial stress arose during the panics of the National Banking Era in 1873, 
1884, 1890, 1893, and most dramatically 1907.  During those crises, when system-wide 
reserves were tight, the New York stock market faced a lack of credit for call market 
loans, and the call money interest rate would increase sharply.  Figure 1 displays the call 
money interest rate and the commercial paper rate (each the monthly average of the 
weekly rates) over the time period 1890 to 1910.  Generally, the call rate was below the 
rate of interest paid on commercial paper (and on time), but there were notable sharp 
upward spikes in the call money interest rate associated with these periods of “financial 
stringency.”5  These spikes were much higher in the years leading up to 1907. 
Figure 2 presents an estimate of the volatility of the call loan rate based upon a 
simple random walk model of the expected call loan rate using weekly observations.  
Volatility is clearly higher in the years leading up to the panic than in the aftermath of the 
panic.  In 1908, volatility falls close to zero, consistent with the evidence provided by 
 7 
Fohlin, Gerhig, and Hass (2016, p. 16). 
The volatility of the call loan interest rate in the years leading up to the Panic of 
1907 was higher than previously observed, and contemporary observers attributed this to 
larger fluctuations in the volume of funds available for issue on call.  Woodlock (1908) 
was especially concerned that the direct lending by interior banks on the call market was 
potentially destabilizing because it bypassed the New York City national banks, thereby 
hindering their interest in preserving a liquid market.  
We know from historical documentation that there was a perception of 
insufficient liquidity on the call loan market in October of 1907.6  The behavior of the 
call money interest rate supports that view, reaching a high of 125% per annum on 
October 24, even though very few trades were placed at that price.  Under those 
circumstances, the New York Clearing House banks likely were willing to deal directly 
with the trust companies (although on terms determined by the Clearing House) in order 
to prevent panic induced stock sell-offs in an illiquid stock market, despite a history of 
rivalry and dissention.7  Ultimately the New York banks under the guidance of J.P. 
Morgan  took over nearly $70 million in call loans from outside lenders like the trusts by 
creating money pools to provide funds to maintain funding liquidity to keep the call loan 
market from freezing up. 
Griffiss (1925), Watkins (1929), and Myers (1931) comment that the New York 
City Clearing House banks were the largest local source of call loan funds.  Also, Myers 
(1931, p. 269) writing about the 1929 stock market crash notes that ‘the New York banks 
comprised the only group which felt any responsibility for the market, and therefore the 
only group which felt obliged to assume the loan burden as other lenders withdrew.’  This 
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does not imply that the big six banks and J.P. Morgan intervened out of altruistic concern 
for the participants in the call loan market.  Maintaining the funding liquidity of the 
market by Morgan and colleagues also protected their investments in stocks and railroad 
bonds.  Their personal interest simply was closely aligned with the interest of other 
participants in the call loan market. The statement is telling certainly for its intended 
description of the 1929 call loan market behavior, but it can be applied also for the 1907 
experience in which New York City national banks increased their call loans.8  The 
statement also emphasises the role that the New York Clearing House member banks 
played in this institutional framework, that is, the long-term market participants whose 
intentions were to preserve the enduring viability of the call loan market for all 
participants, brokers and borrowers as well as lenders (Clearing House banks).  
 
II.  Call Loans as Reserves 
The call loan market was not an ideal structure for holding reserves in the short 
run, but given the institutional arrangements of the National Banking system it was likely 
the best arrangement in the absence of a rediscount market for commercial paper in the 
United States.  The New York Clearing House had no direct authority over the call 
market.  Banks with excess reserves could readily park them in the call loan market.  But 
banks desiring to increase reserves or 'borrow' reserves were limited to the volume of call 
loans they could liquidate; they could not directly borrow funds through the call loan 
market.9  Furthermore, the rise of lenders outside of the New York Clearing House 
umbrella became of increasing concern over the course of the later nineteenth century.  
While the loans were backed by equity collateral, this provided little protection during 
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periods of financial crisis.  The Clearing House had little ability to persuade nonmember 
banks and lenders to pool resources in an attempt to prevent an unwanted fire sale of the 
collateral backing call loans. With regard to the Panic of 1907, Paul Warburg wrote 
 
Banks and individuals with hundreds of millions in call loans at their disposal 
could not save those that were drowning.  As already mentioned, without a central 
reserve organization and without an elastic note issue, one bank could only strengthen 
itself by weakening another, and any attempt to call in funds from a debtor would only 
throw him into desperate confusion and set in motion a chain of further embarrassments 
and insolvencies.  (Warburg 1930, Volume I, p. 21). 
 
 
A less well-known contributor to the central bank movement, Victor Morawetz, 
also noted the role of the call loan market in spreading the credit problems during the 
Panic of 1907:  
Each bank that has loaned money on call assumes that, in case of need, it can 
strengthen its reserve by calling such loans; but it fails to consider that, generally, when a 
loan is called the borrower is obliged to borrow the same sum from some other bank, 
although a high rate of interest may be enacted, and, therefore, that call loans affect the 
security of the entire bank situation practically to the same extent as time loans. 
(Morawetz 1909, pp. 48-49.) 
 
 
The call loan market under normal conditions could have loans rearranged to meet 
bank specific liquidity needs while remaining liquid overall.  Under a systemic increase 
in the demand for cash or liquidity, the call loan market could not produce a net increase 
in liquidity.  While the Clearing House banks could issue clearinghouse loan certificates 
to increase cash available to panicked depositors and correspondent banks, loan 
certificates made existing assets more liquid and could provide only a limited increase in 
system liquidity.10 
The disruption from outside lenders during the Panic of 1907 revealed the risks of 
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linking, however inadvertently, the payments system to capital markets.  Before 1907 the 
New York Clearing House banks had been the important intermediaries for coordinating 
the payments system; indirectly they served as key intermediaries for capital allocation 
through the call loan market. A key feature of subsequent central banking proposals was 
a common opposition to the call loan market as a secondary source of liquidity for the US 
financial system.  This was an attempt to limit the connection between the payment 
system and capital markets.  In earlier panics, the New York Clearing House banks had 
sufficient resources to maintain liquidity on the call market while suspending 
convertibility of deposits into currency in the payment system. The diminishing relative 
size, and hence, influence of the New York Clearing House banks weakened their ability 
to offset the risks faced by the financial system during the Panic of 1907, both in the call 
market and in secondary effects to the payments system.  The banks may have recovered 
some influence over the call market after the panic, but a source of reserves outside of the 
call loan market did not appear until seven years later when the Federal Reserve System 
was founded. 
  
III. The Outsiders 
The largest source of lending outside of the national banks in 1907 came from the trust 
companies, state-chartered intermediaries originally chartered to attract time deposits and hold 
funds in trust.  The trust companies in New York City grew tremendously between 1896 and 
1907, so much so that by 1907 they were roughly comparable in size to the national banks in 
New York City when measured by assets or deposits (Barnett 1910, p, 235; White 1984, p. 37; 
Livingston 1986, p. 139).  In New York State the reserve requirement for trusts was 15 percent, 
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but only one third of that had to be vault cash; the rest could be deposits at banks.  In contrast, 
national banks in New York City faced a 25 percent reserve requirement in the form of gold or 
legal tender in their vaults.  During much of the nineteenth century the trust companies had been 
much less competitive with banks with respect to retail payments, displaying only 7 percent of 
the check clearing volume of national banks.  The lower volume of clearings was a justification 
for why trusts held fewer reserves.  
The trust companies had been lending in the call loan market by the early 1870s, and 
several had to suspend payments in the Panic of 1873 because they could not call in loans 
quickly enough (Hansen 2104, p. 551).  While a few of the trusts were as large as the some of the 
larger banks, the total volume of assets held by the trusts didn’t rival that of the banks until then 
late 1890s.  By the late 1890s, however, the trust companies were increasingly able to compete 
with banks in attracting individual deposits and banker’s balances in excess of required reserves 
from interior banks.  These excess reserves placed with trusts would not count as required 
reserves for interior national banks, but they could be used for inter-regional transactions.  New 
York City trusts also often offered interest rates on banker deposits higher than those of national 
banks, and they were able to do that mainly because they held fewer non-interest earning cash 
balances.  That is, trust companies paid a lower reserve tax because a smaller proportion of their 
assets was mandated to be held as cash.  The balances in excess of required reserves held at trust 
companies were purportedly put to use in the call loan market, although it is difficult to find 
official measures of call loans held by trusts before the panic.  
As the resources of trusts grew, so did their participation in the call loan market, 
which is consistent with comments made by O.M.W. Sprague (1903, p. 47): ‘By far, the 
larger part of the loans of trust companies are made against collateral securities.  In the 
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call loan market, they compete constantly with the banks, and are said to take a larger 
proportion of the total of those loans than of time.’  The trust companies participated in 
the call loan market both as suppliers of funds directly and as agents of interior bank 
funds.11 
Thomas Woodlock, writing in 1908, expressed the concern apparent at the time 
about the influence of direct lending by out of town banks on the call loan market.  
Although they used New York banks as agents in placing the loans, such loans did not 
appear in the weekly bank statement of the New York banks.  He describes the potential 
danger as follows: 
This practice first attracted attention as a dangerous element in the 
situation in the summer of 1902.  At that time a quiet investigation 
developed the fact that something over one hundred million dollars was 
being lent in this way by out-of-town institutions, subject to the call of 
those institutions.  It was a time of considerable stringency in the money 
market, and New York bankers felt that the existence of a mass of credit 
of these dimensions not subject to control has within it the potency of 
disaster…. In December of last year (1906) it was estimated that over four 
hundred million dollars of money were being loaned in New York City for 
account of country institutions, over which New York banks had no 
control whatever.  In view of what has happened in the last three months 
(of 1907) we may be truly grateful that the storm did not break as it might 
have broken twelve months ago, instead of coming, as it did, after many 
months of very severe liquidation, during which these direct loans by 
country banks were enormously reduced (Woodlock 1908, pp. 36-37). 
 
 
The President of the New York Clearing House, Alexander Gilbert, expressed 
similar, concern in September 1908 in his address to the American Bankers’ Association 
Conference: 
They (New York Clearing House banks) realized also that a 
dangerous situation had been created by the large amount of funds sent to 
New York by the interior banks to be loaned in Wall Street at prevailing 
high rates, knowing full well that the first indication of trouble would 
result in a recall of those funds.  …  Another threatening danger was the 
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large volume of trust company deposits, almost as great as the bank 
deposits, against which a very small percentage of cash reserve was being 
carried (ABA 1908, p. 256). 
 
In contrast to the New York City national banks, interior country banks typically 
had not considered the ‘external effects’ of liquidating call loans.  Bartow Griffiss also 
notes this concern: 
Country bankers realize that the small individual loans which they 
make in the call money market are practically negligible in comparison 
with the huge volume of funds which is daily lent or withdrawn from the 
market.  Hence they feel no trepidation as to what effect their withdrawals 
will have on such a market, whereas in a more limited and narrow market, 
similar withdrawals, would have a serious effect on the general tone of the 
market from which they were withdrawn (Griffiss 1925, p. 92). 
 
   
Canadian banks were another source of outside lending and had about $60 million 
lent on call in December 1906; by December 1907 that amount was down to $42 million 
owing to reductions in New York City.  Rather than adjusting domestic loans to maintain 
reserves, the Canadian banks used call loans as a source to adjust reserves.  Jacob Viner 
notes that this practice led to these ‘outside reserves’ held in New York fluctuating much 
more than reserves held in Canada (Viner 1924, p. 177).  Leonard Watkins notes that 
withdrawals of funds from the call loan market by Canadian banks in 1907 ‘added to the 
difficulties of New York banks during this period’ (Watkins 1929, pp. 30-31). 
Writing for the National Monetary Commission, John Joseph French describes the 
use of call loans by larger Canadian banks in some detail.12  He points out that Canadian 
bankers view reserves as being made up of four types of assets: 1) cash, 2) balances at 
other banks, 3) call loans, and 4) securities (p.70).  Call loans serving as reserves are for 
the most part call loans made in New York.  Call loans made in Canada were less liquid 
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than New York call loans and were rarely called in suddenly.  Canadian bankers realized 
that calling in Canadian call loans would not result in a net increase in cash for the 
Canadian banking system, preferring to call in New York call loans.  In 1907 call loans 
outside Canada accounted for about a third of Canadian bank reserves (chart 8). 
When the panic struck in New York, Johnson points out that Canadian banks 
‘immediately adopted measures of self-protection.” (p.117).  Over the next two weeks 
they withdrew over $22 million in call loans from New York.  Given that New York 
banks increased their loans during the panic by more than $70 million, in part from taking 
over call loans of trust companies, the reduction by Canadian banks was significant.  
After the panic, Canadian banks returned to the New York call loan market.  After 
October, 1908, their participation grew dramatically to over $135 million by December, 
1909, up from $42 million in December, 1907.  The Bank of Montreal was the single 
biggest lender, having $77 million lent on call in New York in October, 1909 (p.49).   
Johnson claims this run up in call loans was due to the lack of worthwhile lending 
opportunities in Canada at the time. (p. 83) 
John T.P. Knight, the secretary–treasurer of the Canadian Banker’s Association 
and the manager of the Montreal Clearing House, speaking in Winnipeg, Canada in 
September 1907, echoed Joseph French Johnson’s views on call loans made by Canadian 
banks in New York.  The Monetary Times reports Knights view on call loans: 
 Mr. Knight thought that call loans in Canada could not be realized upon in case 
of emergency.  Therefore, the term “call” was a misnomer.  Money loaned under such 
circumstances in the United States could be obtained for immediate use, being covered by 
such securities as could be realized at once.  When there was depression in Canada its 
securities would naturally be unrealizable, and banks could not obtain the necessary 
money to satisfy the depositors (The Monetary Times, September 7, 1907, p. 381). 
 
There was concern that the funds being lent by Canadian banks on call in New York 
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should be lent in Canada.  Speaking at the annual meeting of shareholders of the Bank of 
Montreal, the vice president of the bank, Sir Edward Clouston, vigorously defended the 
practice.  First, he notes the safety of holding reserves in New York call loans: 
Every dollar of this money is loaned on call at short time upon the most ample 
security.  It constitutes a part of the reserves of Canadian banks.  If tomorrow we were to 
call in the whole of our loans of this class, which at all times are immediately available, 
the mercantile public of Canada would derive absolutely no benefit from the action.  Being 
a portion of our reserves, the choice given the bank is between retaining the money 
unproductive in its vaults or lending it at call upon interest in foreign financial centers.  We 
adopt the latter alternative as being in the interest not alone of the shareholders but of the 
commercial community of Canada. 
 
He then points out the dangers of placing reserves on call in Canada: 
 
Assume that these call loans on readily realizable securities protected by ample 
margins had been in the same markets in Canada, and that the money was required for 
commercial purposes, does not anyone suppose that the sudden calling in of the loans 
would not have been attended by the most baneful effects?  In making such loans here we 
would probably have enhanced local stock market values unduly, to be followed by a sharp 
collapse and serious losses upon the sudden withdrawal. 
 
He finally asserts that even during the Panic, the reserves placed as call loans were 
always callable and could be used to import gold from England if that were advisable: 
I have no hesitation in saying that there has been no time during the present crisis 
when we could not realize all our call loans in the United States, and transfer the proceeds 
to England, whence we could easily import gold here if it should be considered advisable.  
But as we know how liquid and available they are, we continue to retain all that is not 
needed here, both as part of our reserves and as a valuable aid to our international 
exchanges (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 7, 1907, p. 1441). 
 
Apparently, the Bank of Montreal had done just that.  In the week after October 26, 
after the New York Clearing House authorised clearing house loan certificates and 
suspension of convertibility, prompting a currency premium, the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle (November 9, 1907, p. 1170) points out that 
The engagements (of gold) were chiefly effected for the account of New York 
banks; it is noteworthy, however, that 1 ½ millions was ordered by the Bank of Montreal 
8 ½ millions by banks in Chicago, and smaller amounts by other domestic institutions in 
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interior cities. 
 
 
 
 
Georg Rich (1989) challenges the view that Canadian banks worsened the panic 
in New York by withdrawing gold by reducing call loans and returning the proceeds in 
gold to Canada.  He argues that Canadian exporters let the lag between exports and 
receipts increase, easing the seasonal liquidity problems in New York.  He also presents 
evidence that Canadian banks actually shipped gold to New York during the panic, 
further easing the liquidity problems.  There is, however, no contradiction between these 
two stories.  Johnson is arguing that Canadian banks liquidated call loans in New York; 
this would have happened during the week of October 21.  After clearing house loan 
certificates were authorised by the New York Clearing House and suspension of deposit 
convertibility announced on October 26, a currency premium appeared the next week in 
New York.  The premium was large enough, around 3 percent, to start attracting gold 
inflows from abroad.  Gold imports from Europe started arriving two weeks later.  Rich 
(1989, p. 142) reports that because of the premium $2 million worth of gold was shipped 
from Montreal to New York on November 30.   
This timing is not at all inconsistent with an initial withdrawal of gold through the 
liquidation of call loans followed by return flows of gold in response to subsequent 
appearance of the currency premium.  Because much of the monetary evidence Rich 
presents for Canada is quarterly, these very short-term gold flows at the beginning of the 
panic will not be observable, having been swamped by quarterly averages.  Canadian 
banks could very well have ended up serving as a ‘lender of last resort’ to New York in 
1907 after their initial withdrawal of call loans. 
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IV. New Estimates of Call Loans. 
Identifying who was lending on the call loan market in New York remains a 
problem.  Call loans aggregated across all US national banks in August 1907 showed 
$832 million out of total loans of $4,678 million, just over 15 percent of all national bank 
loans as call loans (See Table 1).13  The New York national banks provided $252 million 
in call loans, which was about 36 percent of all New York national bank loans (U.S. 
Comptroller, 1907, p. 166-7).  The amount of loans on call at the New York Stock 
Exchange, however, was much larger than the funds directly contributed by the New 
York City national banks.  Also, the ‘total’ numbers reflect call loan exposure of national 
banks, and so they do not include funds placed in the call market directly by New York 
City trust companies, the funds from interior state-chartered banks, or from private banks.  
Also, it is likely that the state banks and some interior national banks used a New York 
City trust company as its agent for issuing call loans.   
The actual size of the call loan market is hard to determine, as there was no 
specific agency monitoring it and regularly collecting information on the volume of call 
loans.  A similar problem existed with the repo market during the financial crisis of 2007-
09.  National banks reported their volume of call loans once a year to the Comptroller of 
the Currency, but no numbers for individual banks were published.  The Comptroller also 
did not make a distinction between collateralized loans on time and on call in the Annual 
Report.   
In making a call loan, the lender, usually a bank, kept the collateral and put it in 
an envelope with the description of the loan amount and borrower written on the outside.  
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Any changes to the loan were written on the envelope.  When the loan was liquidated, 
often just after one day, the collateral was returned and the envelope destroyed.  So there 
was likely little daily record of the volume of call loans, the identity of the borrowers, or 
the nature of the collateral presented kept by banks (O’Sullivan 2016, p. 294-5). 
Trust companies and state banks did not have to report to the Comptroller.  This 
heightened lender uncertainty about the call loan market, especially among the trusts, 
whose presidents didn’t know each other well, or the out of town lenders who did not 
know the extent or character of other lenders.14  The competition to supply funds to the 
call loan market reduced the profit margins of the New York City national banks and also 
limited the effectiveness of their attempts to quell call market disruptions arising from a 
lack of liquidity.   
Margaret Myers and Leonard Watkins point out that the only source of evidence 
on the volume of funds being lent on the call loan market and the type of lender—bank, 
trust company, or out of town lender--is contained in the records of the Pujo Committee 
hearings on the money trust in New York held in response to Panic of 1907.  The 
Committee requested New York banks and trust companies to report the volume of 
correspondent deposits and call loans made for correspondents on for their own account.  
About 30 NYC banks and trust companies reported their own loans and those made for 
correspondents on stock exchange collateral to the Committee.  The reports are for 
January, June, and November for 1908 through 1912, and they report loans by reporting 
intermediary along with correspondent deposits.  Unfortunately, the records start only in 
January 1908, missing the run up to the Panic of 1907, but they reveal the degree to 
which out of town lenders could influence the call loan market and, indirectly, the stock 
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market.  While not all banks and trusts sent reports to the Committee, the largest New 
York banks are included.  Interior banks making call loans without using a New York 
agent are not covered by these figures. 
In testimony before the Pujo Commission Hearings, several lenders on the call 
loan market stated clearly that there were few records of the volume of lending on call at 
the New York Stock Exchange.  Charles Turner, the lending agent for National City Bank 
on the Stock Exchange testified that much lending was done directly between banks and 
brokers over the telephone, bypassing the money post on the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange altogether.  This made the volume of lending on call difficult to determine 
(Pujo Committee 1913, p. 755).  J.H. Griesel, a broker specializing in lending money on 
call for banks and trust companies, gave similar testimony (Pujo Committee pp. 747-48). 
For 1907 we can only guess at the volume of loans on call by banks and trusts in 
New York.  The figures in Table 2 for August, 1907 are the actual volume of all 
collateralized loans held by banks and trust companies, which includes collateralized 
loans on time as well as on call (Moen and Tallman 1992, pp. 622-24).  H. Peers Brewer, 
however, presents evidence that suggests trust companies held a percentage of loans as 
call loans that was comparable to that of the national banks (Brewer 1986, p. 143).  Moen 
and Tallman multiply the figure for the collateralized loans of trusts ($583m) by .62, the 
percentage of collateralized loans held by national banks in the form of call loans, to get 
a volume of call loans estimated to be $361 million.  They also multiply the trust figure 
for collateralized loans by .20 to show that even if trusts held a much smaller share of call 
loans than did banks, their presence in the call loan market could nevertheless be 
substantial.  Their estimates indicate that the trusts could possibly have held more call 
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loans than the national banks on the eve of the 1907 panic. 
 Table 2 presents the volume of all call loans for January and December of 1908 
and 1912 for New York banks and trusts that reported such information to the Pujo 
Committee hearings.  The level of detail found in Table 2 on the sources of call loans has 
not been presented before, outside of the Pujo Hearings reports.  Myers (1931, p. 269) 
uses the Pujo data but does not report call loans for banks and trust companies separately 
as in Table 2.  Mary O’Sullivan (2016, pp. 294-96) also uses the Pujo Committee data to 
analyse the lending of specific banks in New York.  Table 2 presents a breakdown of call 
loans into those made by New York national banks for out of town correspondents as 
well as those made for their own account.  The figures reveal the extent of outside 
lending that the activity of out of town lenders did not slow down after 1908, increasing 
more quickly than that of the New York national banks. The volume of call loans at the 
trust companies fell dramatically after the panic.  As the panic focused on the trusts, this 
is not surprising. The increase in correspondent loans as seen in the Pujo Commission 
data came mainly from the national banks that reported to the commission.  The trusts 
that reported correspondent loans reported much smaller volumes than did the banks.  
The correspondent call loans of the national banks appear to have replaced trusts 
company loans made for their own account.  Whether this indicates that the national 
banks intentionally took business away from the trusts or that they just stepped in to fill a 
gap left by the trusts weakened after the panic is not certain.  Nevertheless, the call loan 
market was not reined in after the 1907 panic, despite the obvious instability it inserted 
into the New York financial markets.  The New York banks continued to have a 
substantial part of their liquidity tied up in call loans. 
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In summary, contemporary claims suggest that the call market became 
increasingly volatile because interior banks and New York City trust companies were 
placing their funds on call directly.  Interior banks using trust companies as 
correspondents and the trust companies placing their own call loans bypassed the New 
York City national banks and the Clearing House, exerting a distinct influence on call 
market interest rates and loan volumes.  As a result, the trust companies broke down the 
dominance of New York Clearing House in the call loan market, free riding on the co-
insurance arrangements among New York Clearing House banks.  More importantly, the 
trusts failed to take into account the systemic costs of their contracting the aggregate 
amount of call loans and the external effects on the financial system during a crisis.  In 
short, the trusts decreased funding liquidity, amplifying the decrease in market liquidity 
as described by Brunnermeier (2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
During previous panics the national banks worked through their Clearing House 
to issue liquidity to the call loan market.  The increasing participation of outsiders, 
however, had weakened the ability of the New York national banks to protect the call 
loan market and stem panics.  Sprague, Woodlock, Myers, and Warburg accurately 
described the threat to the call loan market coming from the trusts and other lenders.  By 
1907 the big six New York national banks, which were lending almost two-thirds of the 
funds lent by the New York national banks on the call loan market (Myers, 1931, p. 271), 
were no longer able to control the call loan market.  After 1907 the New York banks 
reclaimed some of the control over the call loan market that they had lost to the trust 
companies in the years leading up to the Panic of 1907, while their out of town 
correspondents also increased their influence at the expense of the trusts.  But 
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contemporary observers missed the point that even though the big six could discipline the 
membership of the Clearing House through reserve requirements and regular balance 
sheet examinations, they could not control who was lending on the call loan market 
because membership in the Clearing House was not universal and not a requirement for 
lending on call.   
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Table 1: Call Loans and Total Loans for National Banks 
 New York City National Banks United States 
 Call1 All loans1 Banker’s 
Balances in 
NYC2 
Call3 All Loans3  
Aug., 1907 $252M $712M $410M (net) 
$465 (gross) 
$832M $4678M  
Dec., 1907 $306M $775M $388M (net) 
$438 (gross) 
   
Sources:  1Sprague (1910, p. 301). 2Watkins (1929, p. 70, 216).  3Laughlin (1912, p. 113).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Sources of Call Loans in the New York Money Market (millions of dollars) 
 All Call Loans 
In New York 
New York Banks New York Trusts Out of Town 
Aug., 19071 ? 404 x .62 =252 583 x .62=361 
583 x .20=117 
? 
Jan., 19082 467.2 338.5 22.0 106.6 
Nov., 19082 585.8 467.3 33.4 85 
Jan., 19122 662.2 448.7 72.3 141 
Nov., 19122 766.8 453.1 72.9 240 
     
Sources:  1Estimated.  See Moen and Tallman (1992, p. 623).  2U.S. Congress (1913 
(Pujo Committee), Statement B, p. 1193 and on). 
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Notes 
 
1 The withdrawal of funds from the call market by these other institutions is analogous to 
the movement of “hot money” during the Asian Crisis in 1997.  The portfolio managers 
shifted the placement of funds toward the areas of highest return rather than being 
concerned with the long-run viability of the Asian financial markets.  Separately, the 
liquidation of assets in the Asian markets could also have been motivated by exogenous 
liquidity demands arising from outside the respective countries.  The combination of 
these events put enormous pressure on the developing Asian financial markets.  The same 
analysis applies to the failure of the overnight repurchase agreement market in 2007-
2008. 
2  Rehypothecation, or reuse of collateral, was a concern in 1907 (Myers 1931, p. 281), as 
it has been in the 2007-09 crisis.  Such reuse greatly expanded the volume of financial 
assets at risk, well beyond the volume of subprime loans.  The extent of such practices 
was not well understood in 1907, reflecting similar uncertainty today. 
3  The details of the call loan are taken from the example posted in Herrick (1915, p. 228).  
The example is a call loan agreement by the Columbia Trust in 1905. 
4  Brokers could also lend their own funds on call.  The brokerage houses are considered 
intermediaries.  We have reliable data on New York City national bank loan activities in 
the call market, but we do not have such data for private banks or frequent data on state 
banks or trust companies.  We rely on anecdotal evidence, Congressional reports, or 
special investigations to assess the participation level of these intermediaries. 
5 Francis Hirst, editor of The Economist, noted that some banks and trust companies 
privately offered lower rates than the high, publicly observed rates during panics.  These 
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rates, however, were offered to the most reputable brokers offering high quality securities 
as collateral, and they required higher margins than the usual 20 percent.  The high rates 
were paid by the “needy and poorer class” of borrowers on relatively small sums (Hirst 
1911, pp. 114-15). 
6  See Testimony of Ransom H. Thomas, President of the New York Stock Exchange 
during the Panic of 1907, Money Trust Investigation, p. 355.  See also the testimony of 
George Cortelyou, the Secretary of the Treasury, p. 439. 
7  It was well known before 1907 that the trust companies were invading the turf of 
national banks in New York City on both the deposit taking side, and in the supply of 
loans to the call loan market.  The banks were critical of the lax reserve requirements 
placed on trusts, and New York trusts benefited from strong political influence at the 
state level that exceeded the influence of New York national banks. 
8  Laughlin (1912, p. 65) applauded the New York City national banks for increasing their 
call loans during the Panic of 1907 and emphasised the palliative effects of credit 
extension during panics. 
9  Cannon notes that both the Boston and Chicago Clearing Houses had developed 
methods for member banks to trade their excess clearing balances with other members 
who had found themselves in a clearing deficit at the end of the clearing process.  This 
was a precursor to the modern federal funds market (Cannon 1908; pp. 232-3 and 276). 
10 See Moen and Tallman, "Close but not a Central Bank: the Clearing House and 
Clearing House Loan Certificate Issues," 2015. 
11 Myers (p. 269) and Goodhart (1969, p. 101) note that Chicago banks as early as 1880 
could loan on call in New York City directly. 
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12 John Joseph French.  The Canadian Banking System (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1910). 
 
13 Data on loans is taken from Laughlin (1912, pp. 113-114). It is unclear if all such 
demand loans backed by stock market collateral were loans on the stock exchange “on 
call.”  
14 During the peak of the 1907 panic J.P. Morgan even had to introduce many of the trust 
company presidents to each other and then sequester them in his library in an attempt to 
get them to help each other during the early stages of the panic. 
